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ABSTRACT

Drawing from personal experience with a bitter and prolonged labor dispute between the administration and faculty union of the Foothill-De Anza Community College District, this paper offers observations about the factors acting as barriers to individuals taking responsibility for an institution's well-being. After outlining the problems that unfolded in the district, the paper defines the character of responsibility and irresponsibility within the context of an institution. Next, a picture is provided of the authoritarian, anti-authoritarian, and rational ideal types and the role people with these characteristics play in labor disputes. The paper then considers how individuals' experience affects their judgment, especially in situations of conflict, and how responsible behavior towards an institution is influenced by personal commitment towards that institution. Next, four barriers to the development of a sense of personal responsibility in members of an institution are presented: (1) the prevailing management ethos, which does not include staff as "owners" of the institution; (2) the inadequacy of current mechanisms of shared governance, which preclude the development of a sense of personal responsibility; (3) collective bargaining, which assumes that the interests of management and staff are opposed; and (4) the rise of a management class in the community colleges that tends to increase divisions within the institution. (HB)

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Occasional Paper #30

PART ONE: INSTITUTIONAL CAUSES OF INDIVIDUAL IRRESPONSIBILITY

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November 1982

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I was a veteran of some considerable combat experience with a faculty union before moving to Foothill-De Anza. I took with me from the Peralta Community College District a deep appreciation of the enchanting adornments which can embellish adversarial relationships.

Two things about the hostilities in Foothill-De Anza startled me as a newcomer. The first was that they occurred at Foothill-De Anza. My view of the place as an outsider was that relationships there had been amicable and effective. By almost any reasonable standard, the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of the faculty were among the best in community colleges anywhere. I was a new person, eager to make a positive, constructive start. I simply couldn't believe what was happening.

The second striking fact of the dispute was the willing suspension of disbelief so widely granted their leaders by the faculty in support of absolutely outrageous statements and demands. The strategy of the union leadership seemed clear enough. It was hardball, doctrinaire stuff: a carefully planned, elegant propaganda effort designed to bring increasingly greater pressure to bear on the Board and chief executive, to isolate the Board from the top administrative staff, and to induce one or the other to cave in, thus producing major concessions in the bargaining. (Even though I have acknowledged this is a biased description, fairness requires me to state that management adopted a comparably doctrinaire, hard-line format. But the union, its strategists and spokesmen, initiated the hostilities, set the tone and controlled the flow and substance of the dispute.)

The union mounted the most effective propaganda program I have ever seen. It was brilliantly woven into a quarter century of Foothill-De Anza history; its use of half-truth and innuendo was pure genius. Every issue of the union newsletter was a propaganda masterpiece. At meetings of the Board

Prudent deference to sound principles of self-defense requires that I begin this paper with a few judicious extenuations and disclaimers. Such beginnings are customary and, in this case, quite appropriate, since much of the material I wish to present is impressionistic and subjective. Some of it is quite personal. Most of my conclusions are tentative, representing working hypotheses rather than final judgments. Even though this is not a particularly short paper, it is nonetheless highly condensed, and it occurs to me that, concerning its major themes, I may be guilty of saying at once too little to be persuasive, yet too much to be discreet.

Beginning in Bewilderment

I want to begin by describing from a purely personal, administrative, and self-interested perspective two interconnected series of events that occurred a couple of years ago in the Foothill-De Anza Community College District. I want to emphasize the personal, administrative, and self-interest dimensions because to those who lived through these events on another side of the fence my description will seem extremely biased. It is biased, but it is the way I felt at the time, and it is important for the bias to show so that I can properly present the thesis I wish to develop.

The first of the interconnected events was a bitter, prolonged labor dispute with our faculty union, and the second was that, for my purposes here, I will call the assassination, at one of our colleges, of the Academic Senate by the faculty.

I wish to thank Chet Case, Peggy Fryer, Bill Hines, Gerry Kaspar, Peter Landsberger, and John Lovas for their comments on the draft although none of them is culpable for its content.

of Trustees the pep-rally protest format was perfected: inflammatory rhetoric, demagoguery, personal vilification, all supporting a set of demands at the bargaining table that were unbelievably unrealistic.

I was not surprised at the extent to which the faculty did not understand the nature and process of collective bargaining. (Many faculty, for example, thought the administration could unilaterally end the dispute.) I was not surprised at the extent to which some of our highly volatile and unstable people were drawn into the controversy, writing anonymous hate literature and making hysterical statements. The union leadership's strategy did not surprise me. But the extent to which otherwise reasonable, professional, responsible faculty members participated in all this did surprise. I simply could not understand the pervasiveness of the irresponsibility I saw. I spent a fair number of sleepless nights trying to understand it.

The second set of events I wish to refer to in these introductory sketches was the effective elimination of the Academic Senate at one of our colleges by the faculty. I was accustomed to the faculty in other places taking some pride in its Senate, and even in Peralta where relations with the union had been particularly acrimonious from time to time, the Senates were substantial bodies that I respected, that respected themselves, and that made an important contribution, in my opinion, to the academic and professional life of the Peralta Colleges.

So you can imagine my astonishment when across my desk came a campaign statement from a person running for President-elect of the De Anza College Senate, a man, I might add, whose strength and dedication I respect and for whom I have high personal regard. He was the faculty union's former president, chief negotiator and strategist, and in my opinion, he was the principal architect of the debacle I described earlier. By this time his leadership

of the union had ended. He had failed to win reelection to the executive council and he had resigned as chief negotiator. Here is his campaign statement:

> In the sixteen years I've worked in this district, I've never held out much hope for the Senates. I've seen good people work very hard to make the faculty voice heard, but most of the time it was stilled, and they disappeared into their offices hoping that perhaps someone new would succeed. The new ones began, each one of them with the optimism of the unscathed, and last week I was asked to run for President of the De Anza Senate because they could find no one who could be a candidate. I am not running for the Senate job because I believe I can succeed where others failed. I have no illusions about that. The Senates have no power. They can legally recommend and the Administration can legally disregard those recommendations. There is only one way faculty can achieve any influence here or anywhere and that is to unite into a political force locally and at the State level that is influential enough to be heard. I am running for Senate President to encourage the formation of one faculty organization in this District that will represent the faculty in all matters and speak for the faculty at all times. My goal is to unite the De Anza Senate, the Foothill Senate, and the Faculty Association.
>
> If you share this view, vote for me, please.

They did vote for him. He was elected. And my bewilderment deepened. In my fantasy dialogues with distant or dead mentors from years ago, I would say things like, "Nobody ever lost a top administrative job by overestimating the childishness of the faculty," or "The only things worth learning can't be taught," or "Nobody cares about the <u>institution</u> except apparently as host."

I relate these events because thinking about them led me to some unanticipated conclusions, and these conclusions are what the rest of this paper is about. I learned a long time ago that there is a rational explanation for every event. No person acts in ways that he himself believes are irrational, so I knew that however insane <u>I</u> thought the behavior of so many of our people was, to them it made perfect sense. I began to try to understand why, to very good and otherwise quite competent people, behavior which seemed to me

to be utterly irresponsible could not only make sense but seem to be the right thing to do. The question was why? It did not occur to me at the time that I might discover at least something of an answer to the question.

The Superordinate Goal

My interest in this topic is sustained because of my own sense of the requirements of my job and because of the things that are important to me, three of which I should mention to you. The first two are my goals as chief executive officer of the Foothill-De Anza Community College District. One of these is to ensure the long-term viability of the institution. I see this being accomplished, in Peter Drucker's terms, by performing the function for the sake of which the institution exists, by making work productive, and by managing the institution's social impacts and discharging its social responsibilities.[1]

My other goal is to improve the quality and meaning of work-life for organizational members. This is close to what Drucker calls the task of making the worker achieving. It is closer to what Pascale and Athos call a "superordinate goal," the third matter of sustaining interest for me.[2]

The concept of the superordinate goal is the most important area I have discovered in the trendy topic of Japanese management. This distinctly Eastern notion, you will recall, sets out to reunite the social and spiritual person as worker with his productive role at work.

It imposes upon management the responsibility of attending to the whole person at all levels in the work force, believing that only when the individual's needs are being met within the sub-culture of the organization will people be fully productive and effective in their work.

A superordinate goal is an abstract construct that is essentially spiritual in character, certainly ideal, that comprises an over-arching purpose for which, in the case of Foothill-De Anza, the colleges exist and to which all of our people can and should dedicate themselves.

If I may state in this context my own superordinate goal, it is to help create in Foothill-De Anza the fully functioning community college--as teaching, learning, and service community--for whose members work is joy.

Responsibility and Irresponsibility

I do not believe it is the task of our institutions to assume complete responsiblity for the life fulfillment of all their members, which brings me to a necessary qualification in the title of my presentation. Oliver Fulton, another Center Visitor this fall, observed that it is a very "sexy" title. I do not mean to imply by this sexy label that I accept the existence of some extrinsic driving force which compels people to be boors.

We are, each of us, responsible for the space we occupy and the time we take up. We are also responsible for what we do. Our behavior is our own responsibility. I want to make it clear that I reject any notion of a kind of institutionally-induced diminished capacity that exculpates persons for unethical or unprofessional behavior.

Nevertheless, it has been my observation that any individual at his best is quite a different human being from the same individual at his worst. I also believe that there are, in the social, political, economic, and organizational environments, conditions that tend to evoke the best that is in people. There are other conditions in the institutional environment that tap into negative elements in human beings and at least contribute to the evocation of what I want to refer to as "irresponsibility."

Early in my life I came to grips with the question of whether people are fundamentally good or evil, and a long time ago I worked out an answer to that question that satisfies me. What I began to wonder during my thinking about the events I described earlier was whether people are fundamentally responsible or fundamentally irresponsible. The evidence seems to me to be ambiguous and quite adequate to prove either proposition. In a few moments I will return to this question and offer my own working hypothesis.

By "responsibility" I mean behavior which reflects an active sense of ethical obligation to the institution as a whole and to the institution's achieving its mission. The simple absence of this active sense is a condition I would call non-responsibility or unresponsibility, like apathy, that requires one simply to come and go, carefully adhering to the line which circumscribes the absolute minimum requirements of the job. "Irresponsibility" goes beyond this, as I see it, goes beyond the mere lack of this sense of ethical obligation. Irresponsibility involves behavior which is in fact destructive of the institution and its achieving its mission.

A major complicating factor in trying to assess the relationship between institutional circumstance and individual behavior is the fact that different people respond quite differently to the same conditions. What one person feels is authentic, meaningful participation in decision-making, another person feels is a highly contrived, meaningless charade. One man's sense of full participation is another man's sense of total emasculation.

Authoritarians, Anti-authoritarians, and Rationals

I have wondered about these different responses to the same organizational conditions. Here my working hypothesis has to do with the personality orientations of organization members. I want to suggest that the

students whom Stern, Stein, and Bloom studied at Chicago and Syracuse in the 1950's have grown up and now, in part, comprise our faculties. Stern felt that he and his colleagues were able to describe "ideologically identifiable" students whom they called authoritarians, anti-authoritarians and rationals.

Much mischief can derive from rigid sterotypes so I wish to make it clear, again, that this is impressionistic material, perhaps suggestive of personality tendencies and certainly not meant to imply exhaustive descriptions of personality "types."[3]

Briefly, and in highly simplified terms, Stern's authoritarians were submissive to authority figures, liked a tightly structured and directive approach from authorities, had a highly codified view of personal relationships, were inhibited in the expression of sensuality, and in class lacked curiosity or a great deal of independent initiative. These students tended to like business, engineering, law or medicine.

The anti-authoritarians, interestingly, were no less categorical in their beliefs than the authoritarians; they simply inverted the content. Authoritarians supported statements like, "The many different kinds of children in school these days force teachers to make a lot of rules and regulations so that things will run smoothly." The anti-authoritarians supported statements like, "More playgrounds and fewer strict fathers would eliminate juvenile delinquency."

Anti-authoritarians had remarkable verbal facility, were the brightest of the three groups, were challenging and argumentative in class, socially and intellectually impulsive, characterized by sensuality, psychological acuity, and strivings for personal independence that extended even to their identification with discriminated minorities. These students excelled in the social sciences and humanities.

Rationals rejected both ideological generalizations referred to above. They were more difficult to type, fell into no subject matter categories, but could be identified based on their impersonal detachment and emphasis on intellectualization and abstraction. In class they were responsive and friendly. They tended to be what the authors described as "common denominator" personalities.[4]

Obviously not everyone in our institutions is ideologically identifiable, but my sense is that this material is suggestive of significant differences among our people. My general impression is that the anti-authoritarians tend to be most active in the union, the rationals prefer the senates, and the authoritarians say, "It's management's job to run the place, what's all the fuss about?" To adapt some of Martin Trow's terminology, anti-authoritarians tend to be "hot" participants, rationals "cold" participants, and authoritarians are essentially non-participants. Another general statement is that there are no anti-authoritarians in administration.

So, in this highly impressionistic sketch, institutional conditions interact with differing personalities and ideological identities of the people we have on the staffs of our institutions and all of this is interactive with one remaining factor which I wish to call the "paradox of experience."

The Paradox of Experience

In a manual or practical art, experience is at least as important as study. In administration experience provides the key understandings of what is likely to work and what is not, where things are likely to come loose and where they are secure, under what conditions people are likely to accept a decision or will be antagonized by it or reject it, and so

on. Experience teaches the subtleties, inflections, and complexities of the institutional context without which truly effective administration is impossible.

The paradox derives from the fact that however broad one's experience, considering the total universe, one's personal sample is extremely small, and is possibly quite unrepresentative either of the universe or of the next circumstance in which one finds himself.

Moreover, and here is the key point, from the cacophony of experience it is almost always the case that people hear selectively. The words of Paul Simon's lyric are not far from the mark, "Still a man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest." A selection is made from among the elements of experience, and inferences are drawn that are consistent with one's cultural perspective and with beliefs one holds. As a consequence, systematic mistakes can be made based on experience. This is true of all individuals and groups, not just authority figures.

I was struck during the period of our controversies in Foothill-De Anza with the faith some key officials seemed to possess that there was no real problem, that all we had was a small nucleus of complainers and malcontents who were on a "power trip" or were simply trying to make trouble. This faith grew out of the experience of these officials, I believe, both in what they observed in large numbers of people who weren't at all unhappy, and what they were told either by the cold participants or the non-participants about the egregious behavior of the hot participants.

Tell 'Em What They Want to Hear

Persons in positions of authority in any group or organization often select from the welter the affirming voices of those who are satisfied.

Anti-authoritarians are extremely difficult to satisfy indeed, and for rationals, passion is an unnatural act.

I will mention, but not go into, another factor which makes true understanding difficult on the part of authority figures. This factor is a disingenuousness of disclosure in which authority figures are carefully told what it is thought they want to hear, often by organizational sycophants, and often because people lack the courage to step forward and tell the truth as they understand it. Taken together, the conditions which derive from selective perception and selective communication form a difficult obstacle to comprehensive understanding of the institution.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of factors that lead to failure to understand wholly what is going on in an organization. Change is occurring every moment but usually at an imperceptibly slow rate. Often what appears to be assent is inertia or reluctance to challenge authority. People will not say to a person's face what they will say behind his back.

Always what one is told is a partial description. Everything is always more complicated than it seems. Nothing goes away in organizations. Nothing is forgotten. The smallest unresolved issue or unexpressed communication becomes another grain of sand in the organizational machinery.

Thus the curious paradox is that both perception and experience, absolutely indispensible for effective administration, can also mislead the administrator and, in the long term, produce consequences that he would have taken great pains to avoid had he known what was taking place.

The Central Thesis

I began by wondering <u>why</u> so many of our people were behaving irresponsibly toward our colleges and by trying to decide whether people were

naturally responsible or irresponsible creatures.

One answer, of course, is that some people are responsible and other people are irresponsible. This is a fairly typical assumption made by persons about other people. My difficulty in accepting this conclusion grew out of my observation that while some people, and all the hot participants, were behaving in outrageous ways toward their employer, these same people were behaving with the highest sense of responsibility and loyalty toward their union. In other words, they were not uniformly irresponsible.

With the exception of a very few mugwumps who tried to work both sides of the fence to their personal advantage by tattling to management on the union and no doubt carrying tales the other way, people maintained a high degree of confidentiality in union matters, a high degree of solidarity, and strong public support for their leaders and negotiators. They persisted in this through impasse proceedings and through the presentation of the fact-finder's report which rendered the union's negotiations position completely untenable, and even then their move to accommodate reality was accomplished with a high degree of professionalism, responsibility and support for the union itself.

I rejected the notion that some people are responsible and others irresponsible and adopted this working hypothesis: at a certain stage in an institution's history, the tendency is for people to behave responsibly toward those aspects of the enterprise for which they feel personally responsible and to behave either without responsibility or irresponsibly toward those things for which they feel no personal responsibility. Further, feelings of personal responsibility grow out of a sense of ownership or commitment and some sense of power or control at least at the level of what is to them meaningful participation.

Four Institutional Barriers to Individual Responsibility

It seems to me then that if the executive wishes the work force in his institution to be achieving in Drucker's sense, it is necessary to make workers at all levels and in all positions feel responsible. I want to discuss four interrelated conditions which I believe are barriers to developing a sense of responsibility in institutional participants.

Thus I return to the title of this presentation, and I return to retitle it "Institutional Barriers to Individual Responsibility"--still sexy, I hope, if not voluptuous.

The four barriers I wish to discuss are the currently prevailing management ethos or ideology, present mechanisms for collaboration, collective bargaining, and the rise and professionalization of the management class.

I. The Prevailing Management Ethos

Authority in organizations is vested in the owners of the enterprise. In bureaucracies, this authority is delegated through some form of governing board into the organization's management apparatus. As authority flows downward in the organization, a certain amount of it is vested in every level in the management hierachy. Along with the authority comes a corresponding duty or obligation commonly referred to as responsibility.

In community college management philosophy, authority and responsibility must be equal and are considered inseparable. It is taken as a self-evident truth in community college management that if a person is to be held responsible for something, he must have sufficient authority substantially to control it. It is also held that a management person can delegate his authority but he cannot delegate his responsibility.

My current views are that this formulation is so simplistic as to be completely ineffective in pursuing the superordinate goal I have set forth. It is simply not responsive to the complexity of relationships in our institutions, and it is premised upon a misapprehension that authority and responsibility are the same in public, nonprofit service organizations and in private for-profit organizations. I shall return to this again in the discussion of collective bargaining, but let me say at this point that unlike private for-profit organizations where, at the highest levels, ownership and management are inseparable and integral to each other, in public community colleges the staff is as much a part of the ownership as the management and, as such, does in fact have as much at stake in the institution as the management.

"You Can Delegate Your Authority, but You Can't Delegate Your Responsibility." The college president/district superintendent who said to me on the telephone recently, "Tom, you can delegate your authority, but you can't delegate your responsibility," never asked himself, I am sure, where he got the responsibility he thinks he has. He is sure that he gets his authority from the board of trustees which is also ultimately responsible for his college district. But if responsibility cannot be delegated, how does the college president obtain any from the trustees? They, too, have an inescapable responsibility.

The fact of the matter is that while the board of trustees can never evade its ultimate responsibility to the electorate for the proper trusteeship of the institution, it can as a practical matter, if it wishes to, empower persons to conduct institutional business. It is equally true that if boards can empower managers, i.e., make managers responsible, managers, while they cannot evade their ultimate responsibility, can in exactly the

same way as boards, if they wish to, empower others to conduct aspects of institutional business.

This is more than a purely semantic distinction. The "responsibility cannot be delegated" misapprehension leads to several significant side effects of the corrupting effects of unrestrained power. The first is a tacit assumption that since the institution's stock of responsibility is vested in the management group, participation by others in the responsible conduct of institutional affairs is a privilege, not a right. Implicit here is the revocability of the privilege and the implied threat that if people do not participate in the time, place, and manner prescribed, their participation will be nullified or their privilege will be revoked. Such conditions have a chilling effect on many would-be participants.

The misapprehension also requires that all the work of any non-management entity be treated as advisory to management. As I heard a dean of instruction say recently, "I meet weekly with my faculty senate leadership. We work well together. I am interested in their views on curriculum and other academic and professional matters, but everybody understands that all this is advisory to me."

Advice, of course, can be taken or left, leading to a sense, as Dick Axen of San Francisco State University recently described it, of the very low stakes involved in faculty participation. Dick's statement was, "The reason faculty politics are so mean is that the stakes are so low."

The most destructive circumstance, of course, is asking for advice after a decision has already been made, asking merely to stay clean on matters of process. Faculty and staff people, I think, believe this happens more often than it does, but it does in fact happen.

In some bureaucracies participation is the homage authority pays to the democratic ethos. And manipulation is the homage power pays to participation. Every time advice is given and is not actively included in the decision being made, another increase in a sense of meaningless participation occurs.

For some managers, however, who are sensitive to the requirements upon them to perform and to produce, or who are ambitious and want to get ahead by accomplishing something noteworthy, or who simply want to get things done, uncontrolled, unmanaged participation in real decisions can be a dangerous appurtenance.

This point deserves more attention than it receives in this paper. Providing legitimate opportunities for the operation of personal amibition is an essential ingredient in organizational vitality. Where there is no ambition the people perish, because beyond the vision lies the labor. And it is the ambitious who often contribute the labor in such full measure.

Responsibility Hoarding and the Ravages of Prosperity. Last spring in Foothill-De Anza we asked the leadership nucleus of the District, faculty, administration, classified staff, and students, about fifty people, to complete an opinionnaire in which the following question was asked:

> Listening carefully to what can be heard in the District it is possible to conclude that there is a fairly wide-spread feeling of powerlessness on the part of our people. Many people seem to have dropped out of participation in institutional affairs, from participation in faculty senates, as one example, because they feel their efforts are essentially meaningless. Statements alleging powerlessness can be heard from faculty members, administrators, classified staff people, and students.
>
> On the other hand, many say that the problem is basically a lack of adequate funds which heats everything up, that organizational politics is not the game of many of our best people, and that the people who are doing the complaining are often malcontents pursuing their own personal agendas to the detriment of the Colleges and the District.

The following question addresses this issue: Is there a problem with a sense of powerlessness and/or meaningless participation on the part of Foothill-De Anza people?

Seventy-eight percent of the respondents answered yes, fifteen percent answered no, and seven percent didn't know or weren't sure. It is my view that feelings of powerlessness and meaningless participation are directly related to irresponsible behavior.

Another consequence of responsibility hoarding by management is that it relieves the staff of the requirement of ever having to step forward and say "no" publicly on any matter of consequence in the management of the institution—in the distribution of the strains the institution undergoes.

It is doubtful to me that any person is able to participate effectively in the real governance of the institution who has not experienced the personal and professional tensions imposed by this duty. Absence of the experience of having to say no is crippling to the development of the capacity to participate as a full partner in institutional management.

Two other forms of administrative behavior grow out of the implicit regard, latent in the prevailing management ethos, that non-management persons are childlike and unresponsible. The first is the attempt to use fear as a motivating force which, over time, has a highly demoralizing effect and produces the cry wolf phenomenon. The second holds that people cannot be trusted to be responsible, so it is both necessary and appropriate to "manage" the information they receive.

This view was expressed to me about five years ago by a chief executive who said, "You know, the faculty is getting so good at digging through the budget it's getting harder and harder to find places to hide money, but

you've simply got to hide it because if they knew how much you had, they'd demand it all in salaries."

Faculties and other staff groups, of course, would have demanded it all in salaries but they would have done this in large measure because some managements have claimed to regulate salaries not on the basis of any rational policy or plan but on the basis of how much money managers said the institution possessed. Thus, it has been common to say the institution is not going to adjust salaries or is going to adjust them only so much because "there's no more money." Following this approach the management is simply unable to sustain its position amid the ravages of prosperity.

II. The Nature and Consequences of "Shared Governance"

The current management ideology accepts the premise that managers cannot be held responsible for any matter in which they lack commensurate authority but it does not ask the question, how can institutional members be expected to feel responsible and to act responsibly toward things over which they have no control?

Indeed, the ideology asserts that institutional members do have control because they participate in decision-making. People are asked what they think before decisions are made, and their input is taken into account. There is, in fact, the assertion goes, an entire collaborative apparatus for participation in decision-making which is called shared governance. This brings me to the second institutional barrier to individual responsibility: the nature and consequences of these collaborative mechanisms themselves. It appears that there has been a substantial change over the past decade in the extent to which faculty members, at least, believe that the notion of shared governance operates in their institutions. Richard Anderson of Teachers'

College, Columbia, has recently completed a study on the relationships between college finances and faculty members' assessments of their institutions in the period roughly between 1970 and 1980. This study was the subject of an article in the November 10, 1982, Chronicle of Higher Education.

Anderson found that in the ten-year period there has been a twenty point drop, from sixty-four percent to forty-four percent, in faculty members agreeing with the following statement: "A concept of 'shared authority,' by which faculty members and administrators arrive at decisions jointly, describes fairly well the college's system of governance." Apparently this sense of loss of control in the faculty was most acute in community colleges.

What is there about these so-called collaborative devices that is counterproductive? Most importantly, I think, it is the splendid isolation in which they operate, an isolation jealously guarded by all the participants. Everybody simply has to have meetings that are closed to everybody else. Senates and unions couldn't function, the rhetoric runs, with administrators present; and it is equally unthinkable that faculty should be present when the administrative group convenes to make the real decision.

Thus, no constituency as it deliberates is informed by the perspectives of the others. The crucial information, for example, which is routinely available to the administration but not to the faculty and staff, is not factored into the staff's decision-making calculus, nor is the information routinely known to the faculty and staff but not to the administration included by the administration in its calculations.

Paradoxically, the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances so essential to the restraint of power is ill-served by this isolation in internal governance. Separation, in fact, can be a positive

factor. Separation and isolation comprise a plan for the growth of organizational dysfunction.

What is produced in these isolated interest groups are decisions by every group which are insensitive to the valid concerns of other groups, often making rejection of the decisions almost mandatory by the other parties. This rejection advances the sense of meaningless participation, authoritarian rule, and further undermines the possibility of establishing trust and some sense of mutual respect.

Constituent Cultures and the Deficiencies of Democracy. Many of the differences in perspective among the constituent groups grow out of differences in the nature of the work they do. Teaching faculty work with the separate, individual human beings who inhabit their classrooms. Administrators often are obliged to work with people as totals in columns of numbers. The former perspective is the more important, but without the latter, the former cannot exist, at least as we know it today. The isolation of the participants does nothing to eliminate either the deficiencies of both perspectives or the essential unity which the two comprise when taken together.

Always acting in isolation (a fact we obscure as best we can by the contradictory term "collaboration") produces the absence of shared knowledge and shared experience essential to a sense of institutional cohesiveness. It also produces different cultures characterized by differences in language, customs, norms, and values.

The faculty culture prizes discourse, reflection, disaggregated data, process, and institutional conservatism. The management culture values

decisions, action, product, aggregated data, and institutional entrepreneurship. The faculty culture adheres to principles of democracy while the management culture subscribes to the one man one vote principle. This doctrine as enunciated by one of the patriarchs of community college administration, Peter Masiko, Jr., holds, "I am the man and I have the vote."

Some faculty members, it seems to me, would rather vote on something than eat when they are hungry. I have a faculty friend in another community college district who would drive to Tijuana in the rain if he thought there were something there he could vote on. There are a number of reasons for this, no doubt, two of which are that it is easy and safe. It reduces the most complicated set of interactive conditions to a simple binary proposition; it is methodologically unassailable; and no one has to assume any individual responsibility for the action.

Unfortunately, there are other major deficiencies in democracy even within the faculty culture itself. It can deteriorate into an insensitive majoritarianism where the legitimate and often important concerns of the minority are left unaddressed, often simply left to fester. It encourages coalition politics, which further fragment and isolate people into interest groups, and it can promote a win/lose, highly egocentric approach to decisions.

By-products of the Caucus Mentality. One final ineffectual consequence of our mechanisms of shared governance as they are currently practiced grows again out of their caucus mentality. This consequence is a highly differentiated view of what the institution's issues and problems are, as well as which of these are important and which are not.

For example, I mentioned earlier that 78% of the leadership nucleus of the Foothill-De Anza District felt that a sense of powerlessness and meaningless participation was a problem in Foothill-De Anza. That statistic obscures what is perhaps a more significant finding. Almost all of the people who said this was not a problem were administrators. Thirty-three percent of the administrators responding said it was not a problem (five out of fifteen), while only six percent of the faculty responding thought it was not a problem (one out of seventeen), and there were no classified staff who felt it was not a problem (eleven respondents).

The respondents were also asked to rank the degree of importance this issue had "in relation to all of the matters before us at Foothill-De Anza." Of the five issues people were asked to assess, administrators ranked this at the bottom in importance by a substantial margin, while for classified staff it was clearly the most important issue, and for faculty it was tied with one other issue as the most important.

A further illustration of the wide disparities in perception that can emerge from different organizational perspectives has to do with what I described at the outset as the "assassination" of one of our senates by the faculty.

One faculty member thought the campaign statement of the ex-union president on page four of this paper was an accurate, indeed quite a moderate and restrained description of the senate, which he called "a device used by management in order to call the shots." This faculty member said to me, "Your reaction to the campaign statement is a reflection of how out-of-touch a chancellor can be."

Another faculty member asked simply, "How can one assassinate a cadaver?"

III. Collective Bargaining

Our current mechanisms for shared governance do not in my opinion, contribute to achieving the superordinate goal I espouse, and they do constitute, I believe, barriers to individual responsibility as I define it. But with all their defects, they are a less formidable barrier than the matter which I wish to discuss now: collective bargaining.

Conceptually, collective bargaining is based on the premise that the interests of the staff and faculty at community colleges are fundamentally opposed to the interests of managers. More specifically, collective bargaining assumes that public community colleges are like private, for-profit organizations in two crucial respects: 1) the economic interests of the managers are at base opposed to the economic interests of the faculty and support staff; and 2) management's interest is always to maximize its discretionary authority over the work force in ways that are fundamentally opposed to the interests of the faculty and staff.

With respect to the first of these notions, I contend that exactly the opposite is true, viz., the financial interests of the management are precisely the same as the interests of the faculty. Indeed, owing to the politics which shape compensation decisions in the public sector, as a practical matter, the interests of the managers are advanced as the fortunes of the staff are enhanced.

Part of the misapprehension of this presumed conflict between managers' and workers' financial interests grows out of a failure to understand the relationships between owners, directors, and managers in the private sector and how these relationships are different in the public sector.

In the private sector, at the highest levels, it is common for owners or principal stock holders to serve on boards of directors, to serve as chairmen of these boards, indeed to serve both as chairman of the board of directors and as chief executive officer of the company. I know of one situation where a principal shareholder serves on the board of directors of a fair-sized company, and over the past four years, on two occasions, has literally moved in as company CEO during management turn-overs in the operation.

This is unthinkable in public community colleges. The owners are the public, the voters, the body politic. The directors are their elected (or, in some states, appointed) representatives, members of the boards of trustees. Everybody else is hired help, from the clerks to the chancellor. By virtue of their common employment status, every employee on the payroll has more in common with every other employee than <u>any</u> employee, including the chief executive officer, has in common with any member of the governing board. This truth is not generally recognized by faculty or managers. It is best perceived by a few, very astute trustees.

It is true, I believe, that managers seek to maximize their discretionary authority over the work force in order to maximize their flexibility in deploying faculty and staff to meet institutional needs as they see them. Management must use power, in other words, to make work productive. Power without restraint becomes tyranny. Unions become an important restraint on the power of management.

The union itself, however, thus becomes a power which needs restraint and control. Collective bargaining is a powerful remedy, indeed, for the misuse of discretionary authority.

Precipitation and Hardening of Institutional Grit. Martin Trow said in a recent Center Seminar that unions are in part instruments for organizing the discontent and self-interest of their members. That is quite true, but the reality in community colleges goes much deeper. The effects of a statute which established a union as the exclusive representative of its members and requires that it represent its members' interests exclusively are a great deal more profound and divisive than that.

Collective bargaining precipitates and solidifies much of the grit that is always present but in solution in the institution. It heightens the isolation of constituent elements and the preoccupation of these elements with their own interests to the official exclusion of all other interests. And it sharpens the differences between administrative faculty and teaching faculty. Not the least of the ways it does that is by linguistically reifying the differences among educators by defining some of them as "managers" and others as non-management "employees."

The only practical interest that different employee unions in a single employer organization have in each other is the coordination of their bargaining strategies to bring maximum pressure to bear on the employer. Beyond that, their interests are in conflict.

Inevitably collective bargaining elaborates, codifies, and rigidifies the bureaucracy. Inevitably it centralizes authority. It is also true that unions themselves have a stake in coercive management and in some situations behave in such a way as to produce it, for if there is no master oppressing the workers, what indeed is the union's role?

Unions often behave toward their membership with the same paternalism and editorial license they have so long accused the management of using. During the Foothill-De Anza controversies, I was struck by the consummate skill of union propagandists in their selective presentation of facts and the exquisite refinements with which they led, or in my view misled, their membership.

Institutional Mendacity. Collective bargaining has a powerful tendency to institutionalize mendacity as the lowest common denominator of communication among the parties. Stanley Cherim in a recent article in the Educational Record titled "From Both Sides of the Bargaining Table" says,

> Evaluation of the adversial system according to ethical standards reveals the bottom line. Basically honest people have purposefully distorted their perceptions to such an extent that they have been able to institutionalize dishonesty. A hair-raising paradox, indeed, but the history of human affairs abounds in examples of how easily we tend to justify whatever seems to need justification.[5]

Because collective bargaining is an instrument for their legitimate empowerment, some faculty members refuse to acknowledge its dysfunctions, preferring to say instead that collective bargaining does not create problems, rather it is caused by problems, which, of course, is also true.

Further, it is true that collective bargaining does not everywhere work in the same ways. But it is everywhere a potent force tending to produce conditions of threat in trustees and administrators. Two principal characteristics of threatened organisms are rigidity and tunnel-vision. Whether conditions of threat are perceived by the faculty and staff, or by trustees

and administrators, rigidity and tunnel-vision are highly maladaptive characteristics in the contemporary world.

All of this takes place in a system where the management derives no profit from the labor of workers, where, in fact, there are no profits at all and where the management of the enterprise does not have the capacity to set the price of its own product. Sadly, it also takes place in an environment where, in some instances, a long history of management imperfections, peccadillos, blunders, and abuses of authority have created the conviction in the faculty and staff that their interests must be protected and advanced by an empowered, adversarial organization.

IV. The Rise of the Management Class

One final by-product of collective bargaining should be mentioned, which brings me both to my conclusion and back to an issue closely related to the first barrier I discussed. More than any other single institutional cause, it seems to me, collective bargaining has contributed to the emergence and professionalization of a management class in our institutions.

California's collective bargaining statute defines a management employee as "any employee in a position having significant responsibilities for formulating district policies or administering district programs."

The statute says in paragraph 3543.4,

> No person serving in a management position . . . shall be represented by an exclusive representative. Any person serving in such a position shall have the right to represent himself individually or by an employee organization whose membership is composed entirely of employees designated as holding such positions in his employment relationship with the public school employer, but in no case shall an organization meet and negotiate with the public school employer. No representative shall be permitted by a public school employer to meet

> and negotiate on any benefit or compensation paid to persons serving in a management position . . .[6]

Not surprisingly this law was not long on the books when a new organization sprang up--the Association of California Community College Administrators--which has been energized by the most able and effective community college leadership in the State. ACCCA has created a Management Development Institute, which in its 1979-80 catalog of services offered a course titled "An Introduction to the Management Profession for New Administrators" and another called "Strengthening the Board/Administrator Management Team." The community college metaphor in the early years was the family. Out of the family grew the team. Out of collective bargaining grew "the management team."

It is an important fact of life that colleges simply could not function without the accomplishment of certain crucial administrative tasks. Unquestionably, the effective practice of educational management involves special skills and sensitivities. Management training is a highly appropriate activity both for persons who are in administration and for those who wish to be.

The "professionalization" of a management "class," as these terms are used here, refers to the emergence of a management group which sees itself practicing universally applicable management skills and applying quasi-scientific techniques through which another class of people, "the managed," does the work of the enterprise.

The movement in this direction has been aided by the literature asserting that management as an ubiquitous organizational activity consists of uniform skills which are equally applicable in every kind of organization--colleges and corporations, hospitals and armies. Only quite recently have I seen

beginning to emerge strong research refutation of that idea in books like John Kotter's The General Managers.[7]

The notion that some people are active, directing, controlling and others are passive, submissive, controlled has also been advanced in the community college literature. In 1972 Richardson, Blocker and Bender's, Governance for the Two Year College, was published. This book is described on its dust jacket as "an indispensable visionary guide that pioneers new methods involving the entire college community--offers future educational leaders fresh solutions for today's problems."

Without condemning what may otherwise be a fine book by taking one sentence out of context, let me nonetheless offer one of this book's "fresh solutions for today's problems." It is the following statement: "Administration is the science of managing human behavior. The administrator accomplishes his objectives through the effort of others."[8]

I do not know how many administrator/scientists have read and believed that poppycock, but it certainly lends plausibility to the description given recently by the immediate past-president of the state-wide Academic Senate for California Community Colleges who said, "Administrators are a specialized class of leaders--different from colleagues they are expected to lead."

The dilemma here, as I see it, is that in mangement, as in the faculty, there are significant numbers of extremely able, ambitious people who are professionally stuck, who in order to move up, would really have to move out, which is both difficult and risky, who--especially because of the collective bargaining law--see themselves to be in, and are in, a unique status, who expect and need special attention, and some of whom become a major force in the preservation of the institutional status-quo because they have such a big stake in it.

Again it is important to note that mid-level management functions are indispensable to the institution's achieving its mission. It is at this level that institutional policies become human realities. Here role conflicts, especially in first line administrators, are most acute. Thus training in managerial skills and the preparation and development of managers are highly recommended in the academic enterprise.

Several of the most crucial of the management functions are operating the institution's quality control mechanisms, deploying the work force, monitoring the academic program to the benefit of students, ensuring that work is productive, energizing the institution's entrepreneurial initiatives, maintaining and operating the institution's physical plant, effectively managing the institution's financial and personnel systems, and tending to the organizational context of other public and private jurisdictions and the community at large. No institution can survive over time without highly competent and committed attention to these tasks and to the very human tasks of working with people.

There are two significant dangers in the professionalization of the management class, particularly under conditions of adversarial relations between faculty and administrators. First, if top management is perceived as being too friendly to the faculty and staff, this is seen as not being friendly enough to managers. And second, by emphasizing the management team and the importance of management work, both valid emphases, the very real possibility emerges that both the team and the work appear to be more important than they are. The fundamental mission of the institution is the teaching/learning transaction, not the practice of management. Without effective, dedicated teachers and adequate instructional support, the best college management group is an empty entity indeed.

The question is never asked, by the way, whether any part of the key management functions I enumerated a moment ago could be performed by persons other than career managers. For example, the in-and-out, back-and-forth, paths between teaching and administration that are so ordinary in the university almost never happen in the community college.

Hierarchial administrative structures in community colleges were developed to meet the needs of the 50's and the 60's, the needs of rapidly conglomerating colleges in an era of enormous expansion. Hierarchies with "top down" orientations are much more capable of making work productive over time than they are of making workers achieving. Traditional hierarchies also tend to see power as a zero sum commodity in organizations. As it turns out, however, power multiplies when it is divided.

Unfortunately, but understandably, the emphasis shifted to the development of managers and managism at precisely the moment it should have shifted to the development of more broadly based management and leadership capacities in the total work force as a means of adapting the organization to the needs, aspirations, and potential contributions of all its members as well as adapting to a new world with new rules.

Irrespressible Optimism

Because this presentation, which I have titled Part One, has addressed barriers to individual responsibility, it seems to have been preoccupied with negatives. Part Two will deal with the paradox of these barriers, i.e., almost all of them have a positive side which can be put to constructive use in developing individual responsibility within our institutions. And a future presentation will also deal with positive steps which can be taken to overcome such barriers.

President Bob DeHart of De Anza College constantly reminds me, both in precept and example, of the beauty and necessity of irrespressible optimism. Whatever barriers there may be in community colleges to institutional improvement, this century has not witnessed a more exciting or impressive success story. That story has not yet begun to come to an end.

Notes

1. Peter F. Drucker, Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices. Harper & Row, Inc., New York, 1974.

2. Richard Tanner Pascale and Anthony G. Athos, The Art of Japanese Management. Warner Books Edition, New York, 1981.

3. A more detailed discussion of this material is to be found in George G. Stern, "Environments for Learning," in Nevitt Sanford, Editor, The American College, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1962.

4. Today these types are quite easy to identify on the street. The anti-authoritarians drive VW Bugs with bumper strips that read, "Question Authority," and "Nuke James Watt." Authoritarians drive pickup trucks with gun racks and bumper strips that say, "Our Country, love it or leave it" and "Nuke the Sierra Club." Rationals drive Volvo sedans with bumper strips that say, "School's open, drive carefully" and "I brake for animals."

   Stern and his people also thought they discovered another group of students whom they called irrationals, but they were not able to identify or describe them fully. The rationals, you recall, agreed with neither of the ideological generalizations. The irrationals agreed with both of them, but beyond this, the researchers were not able to sketch a coherent picture.

   Had Stern been using bumper strips as his data base, he would have discovered that irrationals may drive any kind of car whatsoever, although they love Edsels, and their bumper strips say, "Eschew obfuscation" and "Save the chocolate mousse."

5. Cherim, Stanley, "From Both Sides of the Bargaining Table." Educational Record, Vol. 63, Summer 1982, pp. 14-16.

6. The Educational Employment Relations Act, governing collective bargaining for public elementary and secondary schools and community colleges, is set forth in Chapter 10.7 (commencing with Section 3540) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the California Government Code.

7. John P. Kotter, The General Managers. The Free Press, New York, 1982.

8. Richard C. Richardson, Jr., Clyde E. Blocker, and Lewis W. Bender, Governance for the Two-Year College. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972.

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